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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Steven Kenneth Bowman appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession
of methamphetamine, entered pursuant to his conditional guilty plea.

On appeal, he

challenges the district court's denial of his suppression motion.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The district court made the following factual findings in relation to this case:
Sometime between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. on April 13, 2013, Brant
Casey witnessed, in his words, "a domestic violence in the car in front of
me." The female passenger smacked the male driver in the head, and
then the male driver pushed her away by the neck. According to Mr.
Casey, the two would "go in spurts." They would be driving and then, all
of the sudden, "she would kind of explode again." Mr. Casey called
dispatch and described the car swerving in the road. He provided the
police with the make and model of the car. Mr. Casey pulled over when
he saw Garden City Police Officer Domeny conduct a traffic stop on the
car he (Casey) had been following.
Officer Domeny testified that he was dispatched to a "rolling
domestic" or a "domestic in progress." Officer Domeny understood the
dispatch call to mean that there was "a domestic going on inside a vehicle
and the car was moving." Dispatch advised caution on the call, but Officer
Domeny testified that dispatch did not explain what the caution was for.
Three Garden City officers responded: Officers [sic] O'Gorman, Officer
Domeny, and K-9 handler Sergeant Walbey.
Sergeant Walbey spoke with the reporting party, Mr. Casey, while
Officers O'Gorman and Domeny approached the fighting couple. Officer
Domeny asked the driver to step out of the car, informed him he was
being detained, and placed the male driver in handcuffs. Officer Domeny
told the driver that he (the driver) was not under arrest, but was being
detained. Officer Domeny considered this an investigation into a domestic
violence situation. Officer Domeny asked the driver for his name, read
him his Miranda rights, and questioned him about the alleged violence.
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The driver identified himself as Steven Bowman. Officer Domeny
asked for consent to search for weapons, which Mr. Bowman gave.
Officer Domeny patted the outside of Mr. Bowman's clothing but found no
weapons. At this point, Officer Domeny returned to his patrol car and
turned off the video recording device so he could speak with Officer
O'Gorman. As they were talking, both officers observed a handcuffed Mr.
Bowman reach around his body and dig into the front pocket of the jeans
he was wearing.
Officer O'Gorman was concerned Mr. Bowman could be reaching
for a weapon or trying to get rid of evidence. Officer O'Gorman reached
into Mr. Bowman's pocket and removed a clear small baggy of a
substance that Officer Domeny testified was methamphetamine. Mr.
Bowman was then arrested and placed in the back of Officer Domeny's
patrol car. Meanwhile, Sergeant Walbey finished speaking with the
reporting party and met with Officers Domeny and O'Gorman.
Sergeant Walbey told the other officers what the calling party had
said. It was at this point that Officer O'Gorman, who had detained the
female passenger Ms. Phillips in the back of his patrol car, decided to
arrest Ms. Phillips for domestic battery.
Officers O'Gorman and Domeny told Sergeant Walbey that they
found methamphetamine on Mr. Bowman. They collectively decided to
use Bullet (Sgt. Walbey's dog) to sniff the car Mr. Bowman had been
driving. The total time from Mr. Bowman pulling over to Bullet's sniff was
not more than ten minutes and possibly as few as five minutes. It is
important to note that, at the time Bullet was engaged in his assigned task,
Officer O'Gorman was talking with Mr. Bowman.
Bullet is certified to alert on methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin,
marijuana and paraphernalia associated with those drugs, which Bullet
does by sitting down. Within seconds of being deployed Bullet sat down
to alert on the front seats of the car Bowman had been driving.
Officer Domeny investigated. He reached under the passenger
seat where Bullet had alerted and noticed a suspicious cable. It was
wrapped around the post where the seats were mounted to the floor of the
vehicle. Officer Domeny tugged on the wire and found a small safe
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connected to the wire. The officers could not find a key to the safe, so
Officer Domeny pried it open with his hands. Inside the safe Officer
Domeny found $400 in cash, a digital scale, and two baggies that he
testified had methamphetamine inside.
The officers also located a backpack on the passenger's side of the
car, which they searched. It contained hypodermic needles. Ms. Phillips
was arrested for possessing paraphernalia based upon the contents of the
backpack. She was also arrested for domestic battery based upon the
calling party's statements to dispatch. She was placed in the back of a
patrol car with Mr. Bowman so they could both be taken to the Ada County
Jail.
(R., pp.125-28 (citations and footnotes omitted).)
The state charged Bowman both with possession of methamphetamine and
possession of paraphernalia, and also included an enhancement for being a persistent
violator of the law.

(R., pp.63-64, 110-12.)

Bowman filed a motion to suppress the

evidence, arguing that his arrest was unlawful and that officers lacked legal justification
to search him. (R., pp.83-92.) Following a hearing on the motion (R., pp.122-23), the
district court denied Bowman's suppression motion (R., pp.124-35).
Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, whereby Bowman reserved the right to
appeal the denial of his suppression motion, the state dismissed the persistent violator
allegation and the possession of paraphernalia charge, and Bowman pleaded guilty to
possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.141-42.) The district court entered judgment
against Bowman and sentenced him to a unified term of 15 years with two and a half
years fixed. (R., pp.148-49.) Bowman filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.151-53.)
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ISSUE
Bowman states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court erred by denying Mr. Bowman's motion to
suppress the evidence found in the car.
(Appellant's brief, p.7.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Bowman failed to show error by the district court in its denial of Bowman's
suppression motion?

4

ARGUMENT
Bowman Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Denying His Motion To
Suppress Evidence
A.

Introduction
Following an alert from a drug dog, officers located methamphetamine and other

evidence of drug possession in Bowman's vehicle. (R., p.127.) Bowman filed a motion
to suppress the evidence, asserting that his rights were violated. (R., pp.83-92.) The
district court denied Bowman's suppression motion.

(R., pp.124-35.)

Bowman now

asserts that the district court erred by denying that motion. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-25.)
He has failed, however, to show clear error in the district court's factual findings or error
in its application of the correct legal standards to those findings.

The district court's

order denying Bowman's suppression motion should be affirmed.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court accepts the

trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence and exercises
free review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards have
been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86,
211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009).

At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the

credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual
inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897
P.2d 993, 997 (1995).
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C.

The District Court Correctly Denied Bowman's Suppression Motion
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right

of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV.
While routine traffic stops by police officers implicate the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the reasonableness of a traffic
stop is also analyzed under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), because a traffic stop is
more similar to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest. Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223
(Ct. App. 2003). "An investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific
articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is
about to be engaged in criminal activity." Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223
(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981 )).
An investigative detention must not only be justified at its beginning, but must
also be conducted in a manner that is reasonably related in scope and duration to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926,931 (Ct. App.
2004). "The purpose of a stop is not permanently fixed, however, at the moment the
stop is initiated, for during the course of the detention there may evolve suspicion of
criminality different from that which initially prompted the stop." Sheldon, 139 Idaho at
984, 88 P.3d at 1224. Routine traffic stops may turn up suspicious circumstances which
could justify an officer asking questions unrelated to the stop. State v. Myers, 118 Idaho
608, 613, 798 P.2d 453, 458 (Ct. App. 1990).
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"The officer's observations, general

inquiries, and events succeeding the stop may-and often do-give rise to legitimate
reasons for particular lines of inquiry and further investigation by an officer."

kl

Warrantless searches are also "per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). One such exception to
the warrant requirement is the "automobile exception," which allows warrantless
searches of vehicles when there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains
contraband or evidence of criminal activity. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565,
572 (1991); State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 842, 979 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1999).
"Probable cause is established if the facts available to the officer at the time of the
search would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the area or items
to be searched contained contraband or evidence of a crime." State v. Yeoumans, 144
Idaho 871, 873, 172 P.3d 1146, 1148 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 823 (1982)).
A drug-detection dog's sniff of the outside of an automobile need not be justified
by suspicion of drug activity because it is not a "search" that implicates a privacy
interest. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005); State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho
436, 442, 34 P.3d 1119, 1125 (Ct. App. 2001).

However, "[w]hen a reliable drug-

detection dog indicates that a lawfully stopped automobile contains the odor of
controlled substances, the officer has probable cause to believe that there are drugs in
the automobile and may search it without a warrant." Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 873, 172
P.3d at 1148 (quoting State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 227, 281, 108 P.3d 424, 428 (Ct. App.
2005)). "If probable cause justifies the search of a vehicle, then it justifies the search of
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every part of the vehicle and its contents which could conceal the object of the search."
State v. Braendle, 134 Idaho 173, 175, 997 P.2d 634, 636 (Ct. App. 2000).
Applying these correct legal standards, the district court held that the search of
Bowman's car was justified under the automobile exception, because probable cause
was established when the drug dog alerted during its open air sniff of the vehicle, and
the officers did not delay the traffic stop in order to deploy the drug dog. (R., pp.12435.) The state adopts as part of its argument on appeal Part V of the court's analysis,
located at pages 132-34 of its "Order on Co-Defendants' Motion to Suppress," a copy of
which is attached as "Appendix A."
On appeal, Bowman disputes both the district court's legal analysis and factual
findings regarding whether the traffic stop was delayed for the arrival of the drug dog.
(Appellant's brief, pp.9-17.)

Bowman argues that, under Idaho precedent, "it is

unreasonable for officers to stall or draw out their investigative efforts to allow a drug
dog to arrive and sniff the vehicle."

(Appellant's brief, pp.14-15; see also State v.

Martinez, 136 Idaho 436, 442 n.2, 34 P.3d 1119, 1125 n.2 (Ct. App. 2001 ).) While
Bowman's statement of the law is unobjectionable, his application of that law to the
facts of this case is wholly misguided. In this case, as found by the district court and
apparently unchallenged on appeal, the officers had no need to "draw out their
investigative efforts" to allow a drug dog to arrive; the drug dog was on scene at the
inception of the investigation. (R., p.133.)
There is equally no evidence that the officers "dr[e]w out their investigative
efforts" to allow the drug dog to perform an open air sniff outside of Bowman's vehicle.
The district court specifically found that the drug dog's sniff was contemporaneous with
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Officer O'Gorman's speaking with Bowman, which the court found was necessary to
conclude the domestic violence investigation.
factual finding, but he cannot show clear error.

(R., p.133.)

Bowman challenges this

A district court's findings are clearly

erroneous only where they are unsupported by substantial evidence.
Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170, 139 P.3d 771, 772 (Ct. App. 2006).

See State v.

The district court's

factual finding is directly supported by the testimony of Sergeant Walbey that he thought
Officer O'Gorman was talking with Bowman while the drug dog performed the open air
sniff. (9/18/2013 Tr., p.87, Ls.11-14.) That is substantial evidence.
Bowman alleges that there is conflicting testimonial evidence in the record. (See
Appellant's brief, pp.12-13.)

But substantial evidence can exist even when there is

conflicting evidence in the record.

State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 649, 712, 215 P.3d

414, 432 (2009). And, as noted above, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses,
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the
trial court at a suppression hearing. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho at 106, 897 P.2d at 997.
Because the district court's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence they
should be upheld, even in the face of Bowman's allegedly conflicting evidence.
Bowman further asserts that any contact between Officer O'Gorman and
Bowman could not possibly relate to the domestic violence investigation and so would
necessarily be an unauthorized extension of the traffic stop. (Appellant's brief, pp.1314; see also n.9.) But even recognizing that contacting Bowman would not be required
to acquire additional evidence relating to the domestic battery, Bowman's argument still
ignores the salient and undisputed fact that he was handcuffed. (R., p.126.) If only to
remove the handcuffs, explain the officers' resolution of the domestic violence case, and
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release Bowman from detention, officers would be required to contact him to conclude
their investigation. And that contact did not have to take long; as found by the district
court, the drug dog alerted within seconds of being deployed. (R., p.127.) Contacting
Bowman to conclude the investigation, therefore, would not unlawfully extend the
duration of the traffic stop and Bowman has failed to show error in the district court's
legal analysis.

Officers' Terry Search Of Bowman Was Also Justified

D.

Even if officers had delayed the conclusion of the investigation to wait for a drug
dog to arrive on scene-a theory contradicted by the evidence in this case-such action
would be legally justified in this case because officers had discovered evidence of drugs
during their investigation. During the course of the investigation officers observed as
Bowman, though handcuffed, attempted to retrieve something from his pocket.
p.126.)

(R.,

Officers emptied the pocket Bowman was trying to access, discovering a

baggie of methamphetamine. (Id.) The district court erroneously held that this search
was not justified by the Terry exception to the warrant requirement. (R., pp.129-30.)
Because the state is not seeking affirmative relief different from what was granted by
the district court below, it may challenge this holding without filing a cross appeal. I.A.R.
15(a); Leer v. State, 148 Idaho 112, 114, 218 P.3d 1173, 1175 (2009).
The right of persons to be free from government intrusions "must be shaped by
the context in which it is asserted. For 'what the Constitution forbids is not all searches
and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures."' Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 (quoting
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)). "The purpose of [a Terry search] is
not to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the Officer to pursue his investigation
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without fear of violence." Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972). To justify a
Terry search, there must be a reasonable basis for suspecting that the individual being
searched poses a risk of danger. State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 660-61, 152 P.3d
16, 21-22 (2007). This "is evaluated in light of the facts known to the officers on the
scene and the inference of the risk of danger reasonably drawn from the totality of the
circumstances." State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 79, 82, 996 P.2d 298, 301 (2000) (internal
quotation omitted). The test is an objective one and is not dependant on the subjective
beliefs of an individual officer. Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 489, 211 P.3d at 98 (citation
omitted).
The totality of the circumstances in this case creates objectively reasonable
suspicion to believe that Bowman could present a risk of danger to the officers and
others. Dispatch advised the officers to use caution when dealing with the call, but did
not explain what the caution was for. (R., p.125.) Then, while being investigated for a
violent crime, and though handcuffed, Bowman tried to get something out of his pocket.
Under those circumstances, it is objectively reasonable to believe that Bowman had
something in his pocket. It is equally reasonable to believe that he might attempt to use
whatever he had in his pocket to injure another or, more likely, to pick his lock and
escape. Especially where Bowman was being investigated for a violent crime where the
officers were advised to use caution, it is reasonable for an officer to believe that an
unrestrained Bowman would pose a risk of danger. Therefore, to protect themselves
and others nearby, officers were justified under Terry in removing whatever Bowman
was attempting to retrieve from his pocket.
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In determining the validity of a Terry search, the question for reviewing courts is
an objective one: "Would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure
or search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was
appropriate?" Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1964)). Considering the facts available to
officers at the moment they emptied Bowman's pocket, especially the fact that they
were investigating him for a violent crime, the action they took was appropriate. The
district court therefore erred in concluding that emptying Bowman's pocket was not
justified under Terry, and assuming, arguendo, that officers had delayed Bowman's
detention to wait for a drug dog to arrive, they would have been justified in doing so
under the circumstances of this case. Bowman has failed to show error in the denial of
his suppression motion. The district court's order should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order
denying Bowman's motion to suppress evidence.

DATED this 30th day of January, 2015.

CR~~R
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 30th day of January, 2015, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

~ R
Deputy Attorney General
RJS/pm
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CRFE-2013-4994

Plaintiff,
ORDER ON CO-DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

vs.
STEVEN KENNETH BOWMAN,
Defendant.

I.

Procedural Background

On August 15, 2013, Steven Bowman filed a motion to suppress "all evidence
obtained as a result of an illegal arrest and subsequent search of both the defendant's .
person and a locked container within his vehicle.... " (Defs Mot. to Suppress at 1).
His co-defendant Angela Phillips joined that motion on August 27, 2013. The State filed
its objection on September 16, 2013.
A suppression hearing was held on September 18, 2013. The State called four
witnesses: (1) Brant Casey (who called dispatch when he saw two individuals fighting
inside a car); (2) Garden City Police Officer Domeny (who performed t,he traffic stop on
the car and talked to the driver, Defendant Bowman): (3) Garden City Police Officer
O'Gorman (who spoke with the car's passenger, Defendant Phillips, and searched
Defendant Bowman's pants' pocket) and (4) Garden City Sergeant Walbey (a K-9
ORDER - Page 1
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handler who spoke with the reporting party). The Court also received and considered
State's Exhibit 1, which contained two video clips taken from Officer Domeny's patrol
vehicle. Neither defendant called any witnesses.
The Court took the matter under advisement and now issues this written
decision.
II.

Factual Findings

Sometime between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. on April 13, 2013, Brant Casey
witnessed, in his words, "a domestic violence in the car in front of me." (Draft Tr. at 5). 1
The female passenger smacked the male driver in the head, and then the male driver
pushed her away by the neck. According to Mr. Casey, the two would "go in spurts."
(Id. at 7). They would be driving and then, all of the sudden, "she would kind of explode

again." (Id.) Mr. Casey called dispatch and described the car swerving in the road. He
provided the police with the make and model of the car. Mr. Casey pulled over when he
saw Garden City Police Officer Domeny conduct a traffic stop on the car he (Casey) had
been following.
Officer Domeny testified that he was dispatched to a "rolling domestic" or a
"domestic in progress." (Draft Tr. at 15). Officer Domeny understood the dispatch call
to mean that there was "a domestic going on inside a vehicle and the car was moving."
(Id. at 15).

Dispatch advised caution on the call, but Officer Domeny testified that

dispatch did not explain what the caution was for.

Three Garden City officers

responded: Officers O'Gorman, Officer Domeny, and K-9 handler Sergeant Walbey.

The official transcript of the suppression hearing is not available; therefore, all citations
are taken from a draft transcript.

1
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Sergeant Walbey spoke with the reporting party, Mr. Casey, while Officers
O'Gorman and Domeny approached the fighting couple.

Officer Domeny asked the

driver to step out of the car, informed him he was being detained, and placed the male
driver in handcuffs. Officer Domeny told the driver that he (the driver) was not under
arrest, but was being detained. Officer Domeny considered this an investigation into a
domestic violence situation. (Id. at 43). Officer Domeny asked the driver for his name,
read him his Miranda2 rights, and questioned him about the alleged violence.
The driver identified himself as Steven Bowman.

Officer Domeny asked for

consent to search for weapons, which Mr. Bowman gave. Officer Domeny patted the
outside of Mr. Bowman's clothing but found no weapons. At this point, Officer Domeny
returned to his patrol car and turned off the video recording device so he could speak
with Officer O'Gorman. As they were talking, both officers observed a handcuffed Mr.
Bowman reach around his body and dig into the front pocket of the jeans he was
wearing.
Officer O'Gorman was concerned Mr. Bowman could be reaching for a weapon
or trying to get rid of evidence. Officer O'Gorman reached into Mr. Bowman's pocket
and removed a clear small baggy of a substance that Officer Domeny testified was
methamphetamine. Mr. Bowman was then arrested 3 and placed in the back of Officer
Domeny's patrol car. Meanwhile, Sergeant Walbey finished speaking with the reporting
party and met with Officers Domeny and O'Gorman.

2

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

There was no testimony regarding the reason for the arrest; therefore, the Court
makes no factual finding on this point. As a mixed question of fact and law, the Court
finds that - prior to Mr. Bowman's formal arrest - no "de facto" arrest occurred.
3
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Sergeant Walbey told the other officers what the calling party had said. It was at
this point that Officer O'Gorman, who had detained the female passenger Ms. Phillips in
the back of his patrol car, decided to arrest Ms. Phillips for domestic battery.
Officers O'Gorman and Domeny told Sergeant Walbey that they found
methamphetamine on Mr. Bowman.

They collectively decided to use Bullet (Sgt.

Walbey's dog) to sniff the car Mr. Bowman had been driving. The total time from Mr.
Bowman pulling over to Bullet's sniff was not more than ten minutes and possibly as few
as five minutes.

It is important to note that, at the time Bullet was engaged in his

assigned task, Officer O'Gorman was talking with Mr. Bowman.
Bullet is certified to alert on methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, marijuana and
paraphernalia associated with those drugs, which Bullet does by sitting down. Within
seconds of being deployed Bullet sat down to alert on the front seats of the car Bowman
had been driving.
Officer Domeny investigated. He reached under the passenger seat where Bullet
had alerted and noticed a suspicious cable. It was wrapped around the post where the
seats were mounted to the floor of the vehicle. Officer Domeny tugged on the wire and
found a small safe connected to the wire. The officers could not find a key to the safe,
so Officer Domeny pried it open with his hands. Inside the safe Officer Domeny found
$400 in cash, a digital scale, and two baggies that he testifiep had methamphetamine
inside.
The officers also located a backpack on the passenger's side of the car, which
they searched.

It contained hypodermic needles.

Ms. Phillips was arrested for

possessing paraphernalia based upon the contents of the backpack.

She was also
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arrested for domestic battery based upon the calling party's statements to dispatch.
She was placed in the back of a patrol car with Mr. Bowman so they could both be
taken to the Ada County Jail.

Ill.

Summary

Mr. Bowman claims the officers violated his state and federal right4 to be free
from unreasonable search and seizure by (1) unlawfully searching his pants' pocket
without a warrant and (2) extending the traffic stop beyond its initial purpose to deploy a
drug sniffing dog. Ms. Phillips joins in both of these arguments. 5
As set forth below, the Court concludes that (1) no exception to the warrant
requirement applies to the search of Mr. Bowman's pocket; therefore, the evidence from
his pocket will be suppressed and (2) the search of the vehicle Mr. Bowman was driving
was lawful under the automobile exception and all evidence found during that search is
admissible.

IV.

The Search of Mr. Bowman's Pocket Was Unlawful Because No
Exception to the Warrant Requirement Applies

Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484, 486, 95 P.3d 635, 637 (2004). The burden of proof

is on the State to show that a warrantless search fell within one of the well-recognized

Mr. Bowman does not argue that Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution
provides any greater protection than the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
Therefore, the Court applies Federal Fourth Amendment law in its analysis.
4

As a matter of law, Ms. Phillips may not challenge the search of Mr. Bowman's
pocket or the car; she may only challenge the search of her backpack. See State v.
Ryan, 117 Idaho 504, 506-07, 788 P.2d 1327, 1329-30 (1990) (to have standing to
challenge a search, an individual must demonstrate some proprietary interest in the
premises searched or some other reasonable expectation of privacy).
5
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exceptions to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the
circumstances. State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 485, 163 P.3d 1194, 1197 (2007).
A. The Consent Exception to the Warrant Requirement Does Not Apply
The State argues that two exceptions apply in this case: (1) consent and (2)
probable cause. State's Brief in Support of Objection to Def.'s Mot. to Suppress at 5.
Consent is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Smith, 144 Idaho at
488, 163 P.3d at 1200. However, on the facts of this case, consent does not apply.
Defendant Bowman gave Officer Domeny consent to pat him down for weapons,
which Officer Domeny did. Defendant Bowman did not give Officer O'Gorman consent
to reach into his pocket at any point. Cf. State v. Tyler, 153 Idaho 623, 628-29, 299
P.3d 840, 845-46 (Ct. App. 2012) (scope of the search, whether viewed as a search
based on consent or Teny, was limited to a pat-down of Tyler's outer clothing).
Because Defendant Bowman did not consent to the search performed, the consent
exception does not apply.
The second exception argued by the State - probable cause - is not an exception
to the warrant requirement. Indeed, probable cause is the standard of proof required to
obtain a warrant in the first place. See State v. Crabb, 107 Idaho 298, 302, 688 P.2d
1203, 1207 (Ct. App. 1984). Because probable cause is not an exception to the warrant
requirement, the Court does not address this argument.
B. The Stop-And-Frisk Exception to the Warrant Requirement Does Not
Apply
In Teny v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), the United States Supreme Court created
a stop-and-frisk exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.

Teny
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sometimes permits intrusions beyond a pat-down of an individual's outer clothing;
.,

however, the State bears the burden of demonstrating that the additional intrusion was
warranted. Tyler, 153 Idaho at 627-28, 288 P.3d at 844-45.
A search for weapons must, "like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by
the exigencies which justify its initiation." Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-26. An officer may frisk
an individual for weapons when the officer has reason to believe the individual is "armed
and presently dangerous to the officer or to others" and nothing in the i~itial stages of
the encounter dispels the officer's belief. Id. at 24. The objective test asks whether,
under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonably prudent person would be justified
in concluding that the individual posed a risk of danger. State v. Henage, 143 Idaho
655, 660--61, 152 P.3d 16, 21-22 (2007).

Under Henage, for the stop-and-frisk

exception to apply, it is not sufficient for an officer to believe that an individual is armed,
the officer must also reasonably believe that the individual is dangerous.
No one testified that Defendant Bowman was dangerous or posed a threat.
Officer Domeny testified that Bowman was cooperative. (Draft Tr. at 38). And although
Officer Domeny testified that people can change on you quite quickly, he conceded that,
he had no indication that Bowman posed a threat. (Draft Tr. at 38). Mr. Bowman made
a furtive hand movement toward his right pocket while sitting on the patrol car; however,
Officer Domeny and Officer O'Gorman both testified that they believed the hand
movement could indicate either the presence of a weapon or an attempt to destroy
evidence.

Because no evidence was presented that Mr. Bowman was armed and

presently dangerous to the officers or others, the search of Mr. Bowman's pocket was
not justified under the stop-and-frisk exception.
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C. Based Upon the Evidence Presented at the Suppression Hearing, the
Court Cannot Conclude that the Exigency Exception Applies

The exigent circumstances exception allows warrantless searches to prevent the
imminent destruction of evidence and prevent harm to persons. See State v. Smith,
120 Idaho 77, 82, 813 P.2d 888, 893 (1991).

"In determining whether the officers

reasonably feared imminent destruction of evidence, the appropriate inquiry is whether
the facts, as they appeared at the precise moment in question, would lead a
reasonable, experienced officer to believe that evidence might be destroyed before a
warrant could be secured." State v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 504, 975 P.2d 789, 792
(1999).
Both officers Domeny and O'Gorman testified that - in addition to their concerns
about weapons - they were concerned Bowman could be trying to destroy evidence
when he reached inside his pocket.

However, neither officer testified what type of

evidence they believed might be in the Defendant's pocket (drugs?), why they believed
the Defendant might have evidence in his pocket, or why such evidence might be
destroyed before a warrant could be secured. It may be that the exigency exception
applies; however, the burden is on the State to demonstrate the applicability of the
exception. State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 92, 625 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1981). This
burden has not been met; therefore, the Court cannot find that the exigency exception
applies to the search of Defendant Bowman's pocket.
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V.

The Search of the Vehicle Was Lawful

A. The Defendant Has Not Met His Burden for the Court to Apply the Fruit
of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine

Mr. Bowman contends that, because the search of his pocket was unlawful,
evidence discovered during the search of the vehicle Mr. Bowman was driving should
be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. However, evidence will not be excluded
as poisonous fruit unless the illegality is the "but for'' cause of the discovery. State v.
McBain<:, 144 Idaho 130, 133-34, 157 P.3d 1101, 1104-05 (Ct. App. 2007).

While the State bears the ultimate burden of proving that the challenged
evidence is untainted, the initial burden is on the Defendant to show a factual nexus
between the illegality and the State's acquisition of evidence.

Alderman v. United

States, 394 U.S. 165, 183 (1969). Here, the burden is on the Defendant to show the

factual nexus between the search of Bowman's pocket and the search of the car. The
Defendant has not met that burden. In this case, the "but for" cause of the discovery
was Bullet's lawful nose, not Officer O'Gorman's unlawful search.

Certainly the

Defendant may argue that the police would not have deployed Bullet but for the
discovery of the claimed methamphetamine in Mr. Bowman's pocket, but no evidence
from the suppression hearing supports this claim.
B. There Is No Evidence that the Stop Was Unlawfully Extended to Call for
a Drug Dog

A drug dog sniff is not a search, and may be performed during a traffic stop
without violating the Fourth Amendment. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).
The Fourth Amendment may be implicated, however, when the traffic stop is delayed
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solely to wait for the arrival of a drug dog. See State v. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 891,
187 P.3d 1261, 1266 (Ct. App. 2008) (use of drug dog during traffic stop did not
constitute unlawful extension of traffic stop when officer did not purposefully delay the
process to wait for the arrival of the drug dog); Cf. State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357,
363, 17 P.3d 301, 307 (Ct. App. 2000) (running a dog around the perimeter of the
vehicle while a second officer was writing and issuing citations did not violate the Fourth
Amendment). Therefore, the Court's consideration "turns on whether there was any
delay or lengthening of the stop." Ramirez, 145 Idaho at 890, 187 P.3d at 1265.
The total time from Mr. Bowman pulling over to Bullet's sniff was not more. than
ten minutes and possibly as few as five minutes. Sergeant Walbey also testified that, at
the time Bullet was engaged in his assigned task, Officer O'Gorman was talking with Mr.
Bowman. Thus, there is evidence to suggest that the time used by the officers was
necessary to complete the investigation into the alleged domestic battery. There is no
evidence indicating the officers purposefully delayed the initial investigation to bring
Bullet on scene. Bullet was on scene from the beginning of the call and there was no
delay in running him around the car. Accordingly, the use of Bullet during the lawful
duration of the traffic stop did not constitute an unlawful extension of that stop.

C. After Bullet's Alert, the Vehicle Search Was Lawful Under the
Automobile Exception
The search of the car was justified in this case under the automobile exception to
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the warrant requirement. 6 Under the automobile exception, police may search a vehicle
if there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity.
United States

v.

Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982) (cited in Arizona

332, 347 (2009)); State

v.

v.

Gant, 556 U.S.

Braendle, 134 Idaho 173, 175, 997 P.2d 634, 636 (Ct. App.

2000). The automobile exception permits police to search any area of the vehicle in
which the evidence may be found, including closed containers. Braen.dle, 134 Idaho at
175, 997 P.2d at 636 ("If probable cause justifies the search of a vehicle, then it justifies
the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents which could conceal the object of
the search."):
Because Bullet is a certified drug dog, his alert gave police officers probable
cause to search the car. State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 283, 108 P.3d 424, 430 (Ct.
App. 2005). Accordingly, the officers' search of the vehicle, including the search of the
locked safe and Mr. Phillips' backpack, was lawful.

The State argues that the search of the vehicle was justified as a search incident to
arrest under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009). As stated in footnote 3, there
was no testimony regarding the reason for Mr. Bowman's arrest. Assuming that the
basis for the arrest was possession of methamphetamine, the arrest was not lawful;
therefore, the Court does not address the search incident to arrest exception.
6
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